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Abstract
This paper analyses the link between migration and sizes of countries. It ex-
plains why larger countries (in terms of population) have lower shares of mi-
grants in their populations. First, the data is analysed; next, a macroeconomic
model with international trade and migration, explaining the stylised facts, is
developed. The model includes country size, which gives rise to cheaper country-
speciﬁc goods produced in a large country relative to the goods produced in a
smaller country. Higher wages in the small country spur immigration to it.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F16, F22
Keywords: country size, migration, international trade, population
1Economics Department, Bank of Lithuania
Totoriu g. 4, LT-01121 Vilnius, Lithuania
E-mail: I. Fedotenkov: i.fedotenkov@gmail.com, ifedotenkov@lb.lt
1 Introduction
Migration is becoming a very important phenomenon in the modern world.
It changes labour endowments from the relatively labour rich to the labour
poor countries, and has important inﬂuences on production, wages and interest
rates. Indeed, borders are becoming more open for migration; education and
globalisation help to overcome linguistic and cultural barriers. Population age-
ing forced developed countries to open their borders not only for immigrants
from other developed countries, but also from the rest of the world. An inter-
esting phenomenon, readily observable in the data, but relatively unexplored
in the academic literature, is that smaller countries (in terms of population)
often have higher shares of migrants in their population. For instance, accord-
ing to the World Bank data, people born outside of Andorra constituted 71.68
percent of its population in 2010; in Spain this share was only around 13.84
percent. A negative correlation between country sizes and shares of migrants
is also observed when microstates2 are excluded from the analysis. This paper
addresses the question of why this is the case and explains the phenomenon with
a macroeconomic model with international trade and endogenous migration.
One may argue that higher percentages of migrants in smaller countries are
rather obvious: If a few migrants come to a large country, such as Spain or
Germany, their input to the percentage of the migrants in the country is very
small. But if they come to a small country, such as Liechtenstein, the impact
on the migrants' share in the population is higher. However, larger countries
may accommodate more migrants. Furthermore, the total number of migrants
in a large country (not percentage) is likely to be greater. According to the
conventional models, this creates larger migration networks, helps to overcome
informational barriers, and make job ﬁnding easier (Comola and Mendola 2015).
On the contrary, migrants disproportionally migrate to smaller countries. This
phenomenon is the focus of this paper.
The idea underlying why small countries accumulate higher shares of mi-
grants in our model comes from the fact that a smaller country size results in a
smaller number of country-speciﬁc goods produced in the country. This raises
their price, relative to the country-speciﬁc goods produced in a larger country,
and therefore increases the productivity of production factors employed in the
industry producing that good. As a result, the smaller country attracts mobile
production factors, including migrants if a certain condition is satisﬁed. This
condition will be derived later in the paper, and it will depend on the weight of
the country-speciﬁc goods in utility functions.
Goods and services produced in small countries are often not identical to
those in large countries nearby. For example, small countries provide oﬀshore
ﬁnancial services, venues for gambling and a number of other goods and ser-
vices restricted in the large countries. Many tourists visiting Italy also go to
San Marino due to its status as an independent country. The Vatican provides
a country-speciﬁc service to devout Catholics. Due to its favorable geograph-
2States with fewer than 500,000 people.
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ical location, the Netherlands provide a hub service for German imports and
exports. Andorra is a popular ski resort that also attracts many tourists with
its tax-reduced shopping. Undoubtedly, the ability to produce and provide
country-speciﬁc goods and services has a large impact on the welfare of agents.
Moreover, as ﬁrst suggested by Armington, (Armington 1969), even the same
goods, produced in diﬀerent countries, from the consumer's point of view, are
two diﬀerent goods, and cannot be considered as perfect substitutes.3 The
imperfect substitution of country-speciﬁc goods was conﬁrmed in a number of
empirical papers (Blonigen and Wilson 1999; Reinert and Roland-Holst 2012;
Shiells, Stern, and Deardorﬀ 1986; Shiells and Reinert 1993). We employ this
idea to explain why smaller countries tend to have larger shares of migrants in
their populations.
The link between country size and international trade has been studied
rather extensively. Keesing (1968) argued that small countries have a compara-
tive disadvantage in many important manufacturing industries, uncompensated
by a comparative advantage in others and suggested that this could be due to
scale advantages. In a more recent paper, Rose (2006) analysed 200 countries
over forty years and found the opposite: there is no visible scale eﬀect; however,
in general, small countries are more open to international trade. Balassa (1969)
reconsidered the ﬁndings of Keesing (1968) and suggested that small countries
tend to specialise in one or several export products. Furthermore, he found
evidence that small countries have an advantage in intermediate manufactured
goods and a disadvantage in the ﬁnal goods.
In a theoretical model, Ray (1977) and Either and Ray (1979) showed that
small countries gain from trade more than large countries, but argued that they
have not considered monopoly power and economy of scale, which may reverse
the results. Amiti (1998) developed a model with two countries, two sectors
and two production factors, which predicts that if the sectors are diﬀerent in
terms of factor intensities only, the large country exports capital intensive goods
and the small country exports labour intensive goods. If the industries diﬀer
in terms of transport costs, the large country will specialise in the goods with
high transport costs. In a recent empirical paper, Amin and Haidar (2014)
studied the number of documents required for exports and imports. They found
that smaller countries, in general, require less documents, and are, therefore,
more open to international trade, the dependence between trade facilitation
and country size being nonlinear. In another recent paper, Amin and Islam
(2014) showed that small countries import more intermediate inputs relatively
to large countries.
Apart from international trade, our model features an endogenous migra-
tion between the countries. There is vast literature on migration. The Russian
scientist Mikhail Vasilyevich Lomonosov in his 1761 work On the preservation
and enhancement of Russian people (O sochranenii i razmnozhenii rossijskogo
naroda) claimed that emigration to Poland was a signiﬁcant phenomenon in
3Loosely speaking, consumers treat apples produced in Germany and Italy as two diﬀerent
goods.
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reducing population size in Russia. He argued that the reasons for this emigra-
tion were economic (larger welfare) and a wish to escape military conscription.
As a measure to prevent emigration he suggested reducing taxes in the Russian
regions bordering Poland. Nowadays this phenomenon retains its importance.
For example, Sweden's news in English (http://www.thelocal.se/, 26 Jul 2012)
reports that many young Swedes are going to Norway for work, increasing un-
employment among local Norwegians. Another recent example of international
migration is the labour ﬂow from Eastern to Western Europe after the expan-
sion of the European Union in 2004. For example, emigration from Lithuania
was studied in detail by Elsner (Elsner 2013a; Elsner 2013b). Modern migra-
tion is also determined by welfare. Pedersen et al. (2008) showed that the GDP
per capita and unemployment rates, have a strong and statistically signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on migrants' decisions in choosing a country to live in. Furthermore,
countries with higher levels of GDP per capita and smaller unemployment face
smaller emigration and higher immigration. The recent ﬁndings of Geis et al.
(2013) conﬁrmed that the determinants of personal income, such as wages and
unemployment rates, have a strong and statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence on mi-
grants' decisions in choosing a country to live in. In this paper we link country
size with the economic performance of the countries, which determines migra-
tion, and explain higher shares of migrants in smaller countries.
The literature, which analyses migration from the economic point of view,
also includes Sjaastad (1962), who considered migration as an investment with
its costs and returns. He showed that the portion of emigrants in population is
the highest for young agents, and declines for older age groups. He explained
this phenomenon with a need to invest in new skills, if agents decide to migrate.
Tiebout (1956) raised the hypothesis that taxes and public expenditures aﬀect
individual migration decisions. This hypothesis has been studied intensively in
recent years. Among these works is a paper by Borjas (1999) who found that
the size of welfare beneﬁts has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the location choices of
migrants in the United States. However, Liebig and Sousa-Poza (2006) argued
that tax rates have no signiﬁcant impact on migration decisions in Switzerland.
Migration at the level of the European Union was studied by De Giorgi and Pel-
lizzari (2009). They found a signiﬁcant (but limited) inﬂuence of state welfare
on migration decisions. In a recent paper by Jackson et al. (2013) a distinction
among education levels of migrants was made. They showed that governmental
health and education spending has a positive impact on the education levels of
migrants, while larger unemployment and retirement beneﬁts attract more un-
skilled agents. We do not explicitly model taxes and government expenditures;
however, we make the assumption that agents are mobile and prefer to live in
a country where they obtain larger life-time income. This assumption is in line
with the enumerated papers, but in contrast to them we also introduce country
size in the model; we explain why small European countries are, in general,
richer than large countries, and, as a result, they attract more migrants.
Wittman (2000) argued that a wise public policy increases the wealth of
the citizenry, increases productivity, and improves military apparatus. This
attracts migrants, and leads to a geographical expansion of the country. This
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could be the case in the past, or nowadays in the less economically developed
regions. But, according to the CIA world factbook, in August 2014 the top 10
richest countries and territories in the world were: Qatar, Liechtenstein, Macau,
Bermuda, Monaco, Luxembourg, Singapore, Jersey, Norway, Falkland Islands.
These countries and territories are very small. All of them have populations less
than 6 million. In 7 territories from this list, population size does not exceed 1
million. In this paper we aim to explain this phenomenon.
Sometimes the enumerated wealthy small countries serve as an example for
Scotland and other regions seeking independence. It is argued that becoming
a small country will lead to an increase of wealth in these regions. In this
paper we suggest that this may be the case if independence allows these regions
to produce country-speciﬁc goods, which cannot be produced now because of
legislation or other constraints. However, political decentralization does not
lead to an increase in wealth by itself.
As mentioned above, we employ the Armington approach to model country-
speciﬁc goods. The monopolistic competition model developed by Melitz (2003)
allows for trade with country-speciﬁc goods as well. However, in the benchmark
Melitz's model, country size is determined by the number of ﬁrms, border open-
ing for international trade being equivalent to an increase in country size. In
order to distinguish between domestic and international trade, Melitz assumes
that there are ﬁxed costs for ﬁrms entering the international market, with the
result being that only the most eﬃcient ﬁrms may export their goods. Applica-
tion of this model does not explain the empirical fact that smaller countries have
higher shares of migrants in their populations. A possible extension to capture
this phenomenon would be to assume that elasticity of substitution between
imported and domestic goods is lower than between diﬀerent domestic goods,
leading to the same Armington approach in a more general framework.
The paper is organised as follows: In the next section empirical results are
presented; section 3 develops a theoretical model; section 4 discusses the results
and suggests possible extensions; section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical results
In this section World data are analysed. The data come from the World Bank
Statistics for the year 2010, because at the moment when the paper is written,
the data for shares of migrants in populations are available for 2010 only. The
data for GDP PPP per capita was also taken from the World Bank statistics,
but as some observations are unavailable, for a number of countries missing
observation were ﬁlled from the CIA world factbook 2010.4 All the data and
empirical analysis are available on the author's personal webpage.
4Namely: Aruba, Andorra, Argentina, American Samoa, Cayman Islands, Faeroe Islands,
Greenland, Guam, Isle of Man, Liechtenstein, Monaco, New Caledonia, Korea, Dem. Rep.,
French Polynesia, San Marino, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Turks and Caicos Islands,
Virgin Islands (U.S.).
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Fig. 1 presents a scatterplot of the logarithms of population sizes and loga-
rithms of shares of migrants in the world. From the ﬁgure it is clear that there
is a negative dependence between country size (in terms of population) and the
share of migrants in it. More formally, we consider the following model:
Fig. 1: log(Share of migrants) vs log(Population)
logMj = β0 + β1 logPopj + j , j = 1, ..., N, (1)
where Mj denotes the share of migrants in the population, Popj is the total
population in the country, j is an error term.
Table 1 presents the estimation of the model (1) for three cases: The ﬁrst
column presents estimation results for the whole world. A country's size in
terms of land, and also population is sometimes supposed to be an endogenous
variable, and it depends on such a factor as the level of democracy (Alesina
and Spolaore 1997; Alesina 2003) who showed that in general, higher level of
democracy reduces country sizes. Indeed, migration to a country may depend
on its level of democratisation as well. This causes a problem of endogeneity
in the model. In order to account for it, in the second column we present
the estimates of the same equation for countries which were OECD, EU or
Schengen Area members in 2010. We suppose that in these countries the level
6
of democracy does not aﬀect the size of the countries and the fact, that, for
example, Lithuania is smaller than Germany cannot be explained by a higher
level of democracy in Lithuania.
Indeed, some large OECD countries, such as Australia, Canada, US regulate
migration in a rather speciﬁc way. In order to check the robustness of our results
to this regulation, we also estimate the model for the European countries only.
Namely, we take countries which are in the EU or Schengen area. The estimation
results are presented in the third column of Table 1.
Table 1: Share of migrants in population
World OECD∪EU∪Shengen EU∪Shengen
Intercept 1.5646 (0.6640)∗∗ 0.8908 (1.4147) -0.0956 (1.4139)
log(Pop) -0.3157 (0.0430)∗∗∗ -0.2178 (0.0875)∗∗ -0.1545 (0.0901)∗
Obs 209 41 31
R2 0.2069 0.1369 0.0922
∗ p < 0.1
∗∗ p < 0.05
∗∗∗ p < 0.01 signiﬁcance level
In all the columns the coeﬃcients corresponding to log(Pop) are negative
and signiﬁcant at 10% signiﬁcance level, indicating that countries with smaller
populations tend to have larger shares of migrants.
It is very unlikely that migrants prefer to live in a small country only taking
its size into account. Probably there are factors which correlate with the country
size and shares of migrants in population. One such a factor is likely to be
income. First, notice that GDP PPP per capita is, indeed, larger in small
countries. Formally the model is written in the equation (2). Its estimates are
presented in Table 2. As expected, the estimates indicate that small countries
are, in general, richer than large countries. All the estimates of ν1 are signiﬁcant
at the 10% signiﬁcance level.
log(GDP PPP/cap) = ν0 + ν1 logPopj + j , j = 1, ..., N., (2)
In order to check if higher incomes attract migrants to the country we specify
such a model
logMj = φ0 + φ1 log(GDP PPP/capita) + j , j = 1, ..., N., (3)
Its estimation results are presented in Table 3. All the coeﬃcients are highly
signiﬁcant. The results conﬁrm that migrants prefer to ﬂow to richer countries.
This is a very intuitive result.
As we have examined aggregate data, we cannot exclude possible other fac-
tors, aﬀecting shares of migrants in the populations, income and total popula-
tions. There can be factors, such as diverse historical developments and diﬀerent
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Table 2: log(GDP PPP/capita)
World OECD∪EU∪Shengen EU∪Shengen
Intercept 10.4703 (0.5691)∗∗∗ 11.5711 (0.6003)∗∗∗ 11.7526 (0.7185)∗∗∗
log(Pop) -0.0875 (0.0368)∗∗ -0.0750 (0.0371)∗ -0.0862 (0.0458)∗
Obs 209 41 31
R2 0.02654 0.0947 0.1090
∗ p < 0.1
∗∗ p < 0.05
∗∗∗ p < 0.01 signiﬁcance level
Table 3: Share of migrants in population
World OECD∪EU∪Shengen EU∪Shengen
Intercept -9.8862 (0.6827)∗∗∗ -19.7044 (2.9280)∗∗∗ -17.3649 (2.5677)∗∗∗
log(GDP PPPcapita ) 0.7255 (0.0740)
∗∗∗ 1.6494 (0.2822)∗∗∗ 1.4276 (0.2465)∗∗∗
Obs 207 41 31
R2 0.3191 0.4669 0.5363
∗∗∗ p < 0.01 signiﬁcance level
levels of tolerance, which may aﬀect both population sizes and numbers of mi-
grants. But the illustrated data allow us to see that, in general, smaller countries
are wealthier and have larger shares of migrants in their populations. In the
next section we provide an economic explanation for this phenomenon.
3 The model
There are two countries in the model, each country produces a country-speciﬁc
good. To distinguish between them, one of the countries will be called Home
country (country H), the other Foreign country (country F). Following Arm-
ington (Armington 1969), goods produced in the countries are not necessarily
perfect substitutes. This approach is commonly used in the copious economic
literature, including Duarte and Obstfeld (2008), Amdur (2010), van Ewijk and
Volkerink (2012). The countries trade with each other. We denote the number
of agents in country H as L, the number of agents working in country F being L˜.
Agents inelastically supply one unit of labour. Initially, we suppose that agents
are immobile between the countries; further we consider another extreme case,
when agents are fully mobile.
The two countries initially diﬀer with two aspects: country sizes (labour
endowments) and country-speciﬁc goods.
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3.1 Firms
For simplicity, we assume that there is no capital in the model,5 thus, production
functions are simply equal to the labour employed
Y = L, (4)
Y˜ = L˜. (5)
Then wages are equal to their marginal returns:
w = 1, (6)
w˜ = p. (7)
Wages are denominated in the goods produced in the Home country; p being
the price of foreign goods in terms of goods produced in country H.
3.2 Households
Agents consume and invest in goods produced in diﬀerent countries, which are
not perfect substitutes. We model imperfect substitution between country-
speciﬁc goods by assuming that agents consume composite (ﬁnal) goods, which
are composed of two country-speciﬁc intermediate goods, and can also be con-
sidered as a consumption bundle.
U = U(Φ(c, c
′
)); (8)
Φ(c, c
′
) = (γc1−1/θ + (1− γ)c′1−1/θ) θθ−1 , (9)
where U is a strictly increasing utility function, Φ(·, ·) is a function which com-
poses country-speciﬁc intermediates: c (Home country) and c
′
(Foreign country)
into the ﬁnal goods. There is only one ﬁnal good in both countries. Parameter
γ allows for diﬀerent weights of country-speciﬁc intermediates in the composite
good, γ ∈ (0, 1). θ determines an elasticity of substitution between country-
speciﬁc intermediates, 0 < θ < ∞, θ 6= 1 and the CES function reduces to the
Cobb-Douglas case if θ → 1. Such a construction of ﬁnal goods ensures that
country-speciﬁc goods are imperfect substitutes.
Agents maximise their utilities by choosing the amounts of country-speciﬁc
goods to make the ﬁnal good. From the utility maximisation, which is equivalent
to Φ(c, c
′
) maximisation, we ﬁnd that for wages in the Home country, which are
equal to unity, it is possible to buy
pi := γ
θ
θ−1
[
1 + p1−θ
(
1− γ
γ
)θ] 1θ−1
(10)
5Inclusion of capital to the model does not change the results; however, it complicates
the analysis because then overlapping generations shall also be introduced to deﬁne capital
owners (old generation). If we assume that capital belongs to capitalists which are outside
of the model, the model becomes unclosed and/or more complicated due to changes in market
clearing conditions.
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composite goods, with the optimal intermediate inputs:
c =
pi
1 + p1−θ
(
(1− γ)/γ)θ , (11)
c
′
=
pi
p+
(
pγ/(1− γ))θ , (12)
and analogously optimal intermediate inputs for agents living in the foreign
country are equal to c˜ = pc and c˜
′
= pc
′
.
3.3 Market clearing conditions
The model is in equilibrium when agents maximise their utilities; furthermore,
all markets clear.
Goods markets clear when agents from both countries completely consume
production outputs.
Y = Lc+ L˜c˜, (13)
Y˜ = Lc
′
+ L˜c˜
′
. (14)
Substituting equations (11) and (12) into (13) and (14) and dividing equation
(13) by (14) we get:
w˜ = p =
1− γ
γ
(
Y
Y˜
) 1
θ
=
1− γ
γ
(
L
L˜
) 1
θ
. (15)
Diﬀerences in wages between the countries arise due to diﬀerent labour en-
dowments. A larger country (in terms of labour force) produces more goods
than a small country, and those country-speciﬁc goods are cheaper. This drives
wages in the large country down relatively to the small country. A smaller
elasticity of substitution between country-speciﬁc goods enlarges the diﬀerences
between wages. Furthermore, diﬀerences in wages are aﬀected by the weight of
goods in composite good construction γ. The larger the share of country-speciﬁc
goods in the composite good, the more expensive those country-speciﬁc goods
are, and this raises incomes in the country.
Suppose that Home country is the large country; w˜ > w holds when
L
L˜
>
(
γ
1− γ
)θ
. (16)
This condition to hold, γ shall be not close to unity, i.e. goods produced in the
small countries shall have a suﬃciently large weight in the composite good.6 The
fact that small countries are in general richer than the large countries implies
that they do manage to produce useful country-speciﬁc goods.
6In a more general model, with other production factors apart labour, such as capital, and
country-speciﬁc production functions, this condition becomes much more complicated. In such
a case, it also depends on the technological parameters, Armington elasticity of substitution
and allocation of other production factors.
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3.4 Migration
In this subsection we suppose that agents may freely migrate between the two
countries. In order not to mix it with the case without migration we will use
time indexes 0, for the period when migration does not take place, and suppose
that at time 1, the borders are opened for costless migration. Then, utilities
of agents received in diﬀerent countries shall equalise. In the absence of social
securities, higher wages allow agents to reach a further isoquant curve; therefore,
the equality of utilities is equivalent to the equalities of wages expressed in one
goods: p1 = w˜1 = w1 = 1. Thus, equation (15) can be rewritten as
L1
L˜1
=
(
γ
1− γ
)θ
. (17)
Suppose that shares of country-speciﬁc goods as inputs to the composite
goods are the same (γ = 0.5). Then equation (15) implies that wages in the
country with a smaller number of labour force are higher than in the large
country. When the countries open their borders for migration, labour tends
to ﬂow to the small country. However, it is likely that γ is not equal to 0.5.
Consider such an example: Suppose that France is the Home country, and
Monaco is the Foreign country. Machinery, chemicals, cars, electronics, textiles
and food produced in France probably shall have higher weight in composite
good construction for agents living in both countries than gambling, banking
and tourism services produced in Monaco. The suﬃcient condition for migration
from France to Monaco is given in (16). When this condition is satisﬁed, wages
in France are initially lower than in Monaco, and when the borders open, there
is migration from France to the small country.
3.5 Policy suggestions
Policy suggestions for small countries, following from this analysis can be as
follows. First of all, a smaller elasticity of substitutions between the country-
speciﬁc goods increases wealth in smaller countries. Therefore, a production
of such goods, which cannot be produced in large countries, is a good idea for
them. The second suggestion for small countries is to restrict migration, since
a larger number of migrants reduces the welfare of the natives. An increase of
complementarity of country-speciﬁc goods beneﬁts the large country only in the
way that emigration from it may lead to an increase of wages due to a reduced
labour supply. However, if migration between the countries for some reasons
is not perfect, an increase of complementarity between country-speciﬁc goods,
leading to a decline in the price of goods produced in the large country (equation
(15)), is not proﬁtable for the large country; therefore, they are interested in
increasing the substitutability of country-speciﬁc goods. This is reminiscent of
the tension between San Marino and Italy in 1951, when San Marino decided
to open casinos in its territory and Italy established a blockade of the small
country, forcing San Marino to renounce their decision.
11
Another policy suggestion, which comes to mind, is that if large countries po-
litically decentralise or even split, the new smaller countries will become wealth-
ier. But such a suggestion shall be treated with caution. First of all, such a
political decentralisation is likely to reduce the share of those country-speciﬁc
goods in the composite goods (γ), because the smaller countries may produce a
smaller variety of country-speciﬁc goods, therefore, they shall import the rest.
This will have a negative eﬀect on wages. Furthermore, for a positive eﬀect, the
country-speciﬁc goods in the new countries shall be diﬀerent. Inﬁnite elasticity
of substitution will not lead to desired results. But even if θ < ∞, it is not
clear why there is a need for a political decentralisation. If region-speciﬁc goods
can be produced in one country, the analysis made in the previous section may
hold for regions, instead of the countries, implying that relatively small regions
producing valuable goods are richer than their neighbours. Regions can also
invest in their region-speciﬁc brands, so that, from the consumer point of view,
goods produced in two diﬀerent regions would not be the same. Promotion of
such region-speciﬁc brands does not imply a political decentralisation.
An example of such regionalism can be seen in Italy: balsamic vinegar
from Modena, Sicilian cannoli, mozzarella di bufala campana are region-speciﬁc
brands known far from Italy. The brands are usually protected by various quality
and origin assurance labels such as DOC, DOCG, DOP, IGP, etc. Could these
brands be better known if these regions become more politically decentralised?
I do not think so. The separation from a large country seems to be reasonable
when independence may allow the region to produce goods, which are valuable
but for some reasons, such as legislation and traditions, cannot be produced in
the large country. Examples of such goods could be: oﬀshore ﬁnancial services,
tax-reduced shopping, casinos, etc.
4 Conclusions
This paper developed a simple stylised model with international trade, to ex-
plain why small countries often have a higher percentage of migrants in their
populations. The model uses the fact that smaller countries produce fewer
country-speciﬁc goods, and their price is higher relatively to the goods produced
in the large countries, if a certain condition, which requires the existence of suf-
ﬁcient demand for goods produced in smaller economies, is satisﬁed. This raises
wages and attracts migrants to the smaller countries. As a result, countries with
limited population tend to have larger shares of migrants. However, we argue
that a political decentralisation of a large country does not automatically lead
to an increase in welfare and attraction of migrants, because the decentralised
territories will need to ﬁnd their specialisation. This can be the case, if after a
political decentralisation, the regions start producing goods, which could not be
produced in the large country due to legislation, traditions and other factors.
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